The Lutheran Approach to Philosophy

The question of whether Lutheranism has a distinctive philosophical identity is an interesting one. The term Lutheran philosophy is not commonly used today. If one were to ask most contemporary philosophers about Lutheran philosophy, they would probably either mention certain philosophers with ties to Lutheranism (e.g., Leibniz or Kierkegaard) or admit that they are unfamiliar with any such thing. This is unsurprising, because Lutheranism is not generally associated with any particular philosophical school or tradition. It is true that at certain periods various philosophies originating outside of Lutheranism (e.g., Aristotelianism and existentialism) have been popular among Lutherans, but never to the point that Lutheranism has been strongly identified with these viewpoints. Moreover, there is no such thing as a distinctively Lutheran school or tradition of philosophy. One might wish to say Lutherans should adhere to a specific tradition, but this would require making an argument; it would not be obvious to most people.

That being said, I do believe there is something distinctive about how confessional Lutherans approach philosophy. In this sense at least, it can make sense to say that there is such a thing as a Lutheran way of doing philosophy, even if there is not a Lutheran philosophy. This characteristic is a strong and unwavering commitment to acknowledging a distinction between magisterial and ministerial uses of reason. A magisterial use of reason places human reason above revelation, and adopts the posture that reason must have the last word in determining the truth and meaning of revelation. In contrast, a ministerial use subordinates reason to revelation and believes that revelation can override the dictates of reason. Revelation’s superior authority is due to the fact that it comes directly from God, while reason is a faculty of fallen man.[i]

The distinction between magisterial and ministerial uses of reason is most often employed in the context of discussing biblical interpretation. The exegete who seeks to only employ reason in a ministerial fashion will let Scripture speak for itself. He will use reason to understand the languages, context, and implications of Scripture, but he will not seek to add anything to the Bible or subtract anything from it. Nor will he seek to attain a consistency or coherence in his interpretation of the Bible that is not present in the Word itself. He will acknowledge that everything in Scripture is true and has the Holy Spirit as its primary author, but he will not expect everything in Scripture to be transparent to his intellect. The divine authorship in fact will lead the wise and humble interpreter to expect mysteries and paradoxes in the Bible.

Although this distinction originates in theology, it is of great importance for philosophy as well. When doing philosophy, a person seeking to maintain a ministerial use of reason will understand that Scripture (and the confessions derived from Scripture) must establish which philosophical positions are acceptable. Any philosophical view, whether it be in the area of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, or even logic, must be examined to evaluate its consistency with the results of sound biblical interpretation. Many philosophical positions will need to be rejected outright (e.g., materialism, skepticism, and nihilism). Others may be affirmed with some modification (e.g., Platonism and Aristotelianism). A relatively small number will be largely acceptable as they stand (e.g., some forms of medieval scholasticism). Because coherence is generally a sign of truth, achieving consistency between one’s philosophical views will be desirable. However, attaining agreement between one’s philosophical views and the true teaching of Scripture will be the highest priority. This agreement must be pursued even if it places limits on the coherence, comprehensiveness, and clarity that one can achieve in philosophy.

Other Christian traditions certainly make some use of the distinction between magisterial and ministerial uses of reason. Many conservative Christians, at least, affirm that reason should be kept subordinate to revelation. A way this is commonly put is to say that philosophy should be the handmaid or servant of theology. But what one generally sees is that other traditions fail to carry this out in practice. Their subordination of reason to revelation is generally not employed with the same constancy and diligence that one sees in Confessional Lutheranism.

It is important to realize that a magisterial use of reason is not always easy to spot. For example, the Presbyterian theologian Charles Hodge insists that a doctrine can be incomprehensible without being incredible. He affirms that “nothing is incredible but the impossible.”[ii] Discussing what is impossible, however, he remarks that “it is impossible that one truth should contradict another. It is impossible, therefore, that God should reveal anything as true which contradicts any well-authenticated truth, whether of intuition, experience, or previous revelation.”[iii] He adds, “we have a right to reject as untrue whatever it is impossible that God should require us to believe. He can no more require us to believe what is absurd than to do what is wrong.”[iv]

We should notice here that Hodge is essentially affirming that anything we take to be true, whatever its source, must agree with everything else that we regard as true. This stance may seem wholly innocuous. For it’s no doubt correct that all truths are ultimately consistent. From God’s point of view, all truths certainly cohere. Yet this is not necessarily true for finite human knowers. It is perfectly reasonable to think that humans may sometimes see an apparent contradiction where none actually exists. They may lack the perspective or insight needed to see how two propositions are compatible. This means that when they encounter two views or propositions that both seem true but are difficult to reconcile, they should not simply assume that one must be false. This is especially true where divine revelation is concerned. We should expect that the truths God reveals to us may have features that elude our grasp. For this reason, clear scriptural assertions should always be taken as true, even if they appear to be in significant tension with each other.

Hodge’s view also has troubling implications. He affirms that all truths must be consistent with our intuitions and experiences, and that God cannot ask us to believe anything our reason deems absurd. Revelation can inform us of things that reason could not discover on its own, but reason can determine whether these things are possible and thus acceptable. From a Lutheran standpoint, giving reason this prerogative is a serious mistake, for it inevitably ends up elevating reason above Scripture. If what is acceptable in revelation is only what reason deems possible, then reason has the final word on what the Bible teaches. Since reason will naturally demand a coherent body of doctrine, anything that cannot be placed within a neat and tidy system will be judged false and unbiblical. This covert subordination of revelation to reason explains why Calvinists like Hodge confidently reject universal grace, unlimited atonement, and the possibility of genuine apostasy even though there is a mass of scriptural evidence that confirms these doctrines. They simply don’t fit within the Calvinist scheme. Lutherans categorically reject the surreptitious rationalism that generates such schemes. In the words of Daniel Deutschlander, “reason does not instruct or correct the Word of God; reason is instructed and corrected by the Word of God.”[v]

A comparable yet more overt example of this subordination is seen in a recent book by Roman Catholic philosopher James Jacobs. He writes:

Philosophy also shows that one truth can never contradict another truth. Therefore, all the sciences have to harmonize with one another: physics cannot contradict math and the discoveries of biology cannot violate the laws of chemistry. More significantly though, the insights of science and of religion, as well as of art and literature, must all ultimately point to a coherent understanding of reality. It is philosophy that provides this encompassing framework for knowledge.[vi]

Here we see that everything must be able to fit into a framework provided by human reason. Like Hodge, Jacobs would no doubt say that religion provides knowledge that reason is unable to deliver through its own methods. But it is clear that he would also agree that reason has the prerogative of deciding what is possible in religion. This is essential if philosophy is to integrate religion within a coherent vision that also receives input from many other sources.

In response to views like these, the Lutheran must point out that such perspectives fail to adequately acknowledge the transcendence of God and the finitude and fallenness of man. To say that truths of reason and truths of revelation are ultimately consistent is one thing, to say that they must be made to agree in this life by sin-addled human intellects is another. Whenever we assume the necessity of achieving coherence in this life, we give reason a magisterial role, since it is reason that will have to arbitrate how the coherence is to be achieved. Reason will have to interpret and mold revelation so that it accords with other areas of knowledge. Some will think attaining this accord is a relatively simple matter, while others will see it as difficult. But in any case, it will end up preventing us from acknowledging any divine truths that are truly mysterious or paradoxical.

What this all means is that a Lutheran approach to philosophy will take the truths of revelation (however puzzling they may be) as providing the infallible and non-negotiable aspects of one’s “encompassing framework for knowledge.” The philosopher’s task will not be to create this framework (at least not its most fundamental elements), but to see how and to what extent the claims of natural knowledge fit into and corroborate it. Reason will be able to make its own observations about possibility only with respect to things that man can hope to understand and that revelation does not clearly speak upon.[vii] In everything, revelation will have the last word. Siegbert Becker rightly affirms that “true Lutheranism insists that men must take their reason captive and follow wherever the word of God leads, even though what it says may appear to be impossible and absurd to reason.”[viii] We thus see that a Lutheran approach to philosophy must be a very humble and modest one, for this is what the truth of Christianity requires, and a Lutheran philosopher will be a Christian before he is anything else.

[i] For a useful discussion of this distinction, see Francis Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, vol. I (Concordia Publishing House, 1950), 196-200.

[ii] Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. I (Charles Scribner, 1871), 50.

[iii] Ibid., 51.

[iv] Ibid., 52.

[v] Daniel M. Deutschlander, Grace Abounds: The Splendor of Christian Doctrine (Northwestern Publishing House, 2015), 83.

[vi] James M. Jacobs, Seat of Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy in the Catholic Tradition (The Catholic University of America Press, 2022), 23.

[vii] Lutherans generally hold that the proper sphere of reason concerns temporal, civil, and earthly realities. This does not mean that reason can know nothing of God, however. It means that what it knows about God it discovers by inference from temporal and earthly realities.

[viii] Siegbert Becker, “Reason as Instrument (The Role of Reason in Theology),” in Our Great Heritage, vol. I, ed. Lyle W. Lange (Northwestern Publishing House, 1991), 62.

Nathan Greeley is the managing editor of The Conservative Reformer.